Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal To Protect Public Records by Kleysteuber, Rudy
RUDY KLEYSTEUBER
Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory
Proposal To Protect Public Records
ABSTRACT. Most consumers learn about tenant-screening reports only when a landlord
points to an item on such a report as the reason for rejecting an application and provides the
tenant with a copy of that report as required by law. Legal scholars have criticized these reports
for more than thirty years, however, observing that they are prone to error, open to abuse, and
generally contrary to established public policies. This Note examines existing mechanisms used
to regulate these reports and finds them inadequate, endorsing instead one state's approach of
"choking" information flows by disclosing eviction records only when the landlord prevails in
court. In a digital age in which personal information is easily aggregated, court records should
not be a vehicle for automatic damage to an individual's renting prospects and reputation.
AUTHOR. Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2007; Oxford University, B.A. (Hons.) 2004;
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, B.S. 2002. I am grateful to my family and my
partner, Justin Fansler, for their years of love, support, and encouragement; to Jay Pottenger and
Frank Dineen at the Landlord-Tenant Clinic of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization
for their inspiration, patient supervision, and guidance; to Fadi Hanna for extensive comments
on drafts; and to Annie Decker for her indispensable insights and exceptional editing skills.
1344
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
NOTE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1346
EVICTIONS, TENANT SCREENING, AND THE PROBLEMS OF TENANT-
SCREENING REPORTS 1353
A. The Realities of Eviction 1353
B. Tenant Screening and Its Problems 1356
1. Errors and Misleading Information 1358
2. Abuse 1361
3. Frustration of Legislative Objectives and Public Policy 1363
II. TWO STRATEGIES FOR REGULATING TENANT-SCREENING REPORTS:
ENSURING ACCURACY AND LIMITING ACCESS 1364
A. The Standard Approach: Ensuring Accuracy 1364
B. The Better Approach: Limiting Access 1369
1. California's First Attempt: Censoring Unfair Items 1369
2. California's Second Attempt: An Access-Based Approach 1370
C. Why Accuracy Isn't Enough 1371
III. A DEFENSE OF OUTCOME-BASED RESTRICTIONS 1372
A. Reasons To Keep Eviction Records Private by Default 1374
1. Efficiency 1375
2. Privacy 1378
3. Legislative Priorities 1379
4. Fairness and Due Process 1381
B. Reasons To Keep Eviction Records Public by Default 1381
1. First Amendment Doctrine and the Common Law 1382
2. Other Values 1384
C. Examples and Parallels 1386
CONCLUSION 1388
1345
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
INTRODUCTION
[Wjith the advent of the computerized consumer reporting industry, it has
become possible ffor landlords] to purchase a great deal of tenant information
that would otherwise be too expensive or impractical to obtain.'
The trend of gathering information about tenants, which began to raise
eyebrows almost thirty years ago, has continued to grow in magnitude and
concern.! Today, landlords regularly purchase "tenant-screening reports"3 that
chronicle landlord-tenant disputes4 and court filings, often regardless of their
outcomes.s Indeed, the tenant-screening industry has mushroomed in recent
years. Informal estimates suggest that as many as 650 companies provide
tenant-screening reports,6 and a recent trend toward consolidation7 means that
1. Robert W. Benson & Raymond A. Biering, Tenant Reports as an Invasion of Privacy: A
Legislative Proposal, 12 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 301, 304 (1979).
a. Legal scholars have described the mechanisms of tenant-screening reports, decried their
effects, and proposed statutory solutions to deal with them. See, e.g., Mary B. Spector,
Tenants' Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46
WAYNE L. REV. 135 (2000); Gary Williams, Can Government Limit Tenant Blacklisting?, 24
Sw. U. L. REV. 1077 (1995); Cheryl M. Sheinkopf, Comment, Balancing Free Speech, Privacy
and Open Government: Why Government Should Not Restrict the Truthful Reporting of Public
Record Information, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1567 (1997); Robert R. Stauffer, Note, Tenant
Blacklisting: Tenant Screening Services and the Right to Privacy, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 239
(1987). The popular press also has criticized these reports. See, e.g., infra notes 7, 20.
3. Though the phrases are often used interchangeably, I use "tenant-screening reports" for
reports summarizing involvement in landlord-tenant disputes and eviction actions and
"credit reports" for reports on consumers' borrowing history and creditworthiness.
4. Landlords can report this information directly, discussing anything from the timeliness of
past rent payments to "past and current experience with the applicant." FIRST ADVANTAGE
SAFERENT, NATIONAL REGISTRYCHECK 4 (2oo6), available at http://www.fadvsaferent.corrV
products services/ebrochures/ebrochure-registrycheck.pdf. First Advantage SafeRent
advertises that its database of landlord-tenant records, "the industry's largest," includes not
only "past court actions" and "prior landlord inquiries" but also "landlord-reported history."
Id. at 3-4.
s. Tenant-screening reports usually recite any eviction action filed, regardless of whether it is
still pending or who prevailed. Yet a recent class action forced one of the nation's largest
tenant-screening agencies, First American Registry (FAR), to stipulate in a settlement that it
would change several features of these reporting practices. White v. First Am. Registry, Inc.,
No. 04 Civ. 611, 2007 WL 703926 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007); see also infra note 75 and
accompanying text.
6. See Keat Foong, Automation Takes Subjectivity Out of Tenant Selection Process, MULTI-
HOUSING NEWS, Sept. 2006, at 72, available at http://www.multi-housingnews.com/
multihousing/reportsanalysis/feature display.jsp ?vnucontentid= 1003087265.
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many of these companies provide reports with national scope. The ease with
which these reports are obtained means that landlords increasingly rely on
them at the first stage of their selection process to separate out potential bad
apples. As one seller of these reports recently told the New York Times,
It is the policy of 99 percent of our [landlord] customers in New York
to flat out reject anybody with a landlord-tenant record, no matter what
the reason is and no matter what the outcome is, because if their
dispute has escalated to going to court, an owner will view them as a
8pain ....
In an ideal world, tenant-screening reports would help landlords know
which tenants are more likely to fall behind on their rent payments, commit
waste, or irritate their neighbors. 9 With good intentions, both landlords and
municipalities have looked to tenant-screening reports as a potential miracle
cure both for the landlord's private fear of fair housing lawsuits (by providing
an objective reason to deny an application) ° and for society's public problems
of crime and drug use."
But the truth is that tenant-screening reports create at least as many
problems as they solve. As I elaborate in Section I.B, these reports may contain
errors, are open to abuse, and may even work against democratically endorsed
public policies. Therefore, for reasons of both justice and economic efficiency, I
7. See Leta Herman, Landlords Take Tenant-Screening Beyond Credit Check, L.A. TIMES, June 25,
2000, at K14 ("Reporting agencies that provide resident screening are consolidating across
the nation.... ").
8. Teri Karush Rogers, Only the Strongest Survive, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, § 11 (Real
Estate), at i (quoting Jake Harrington, founder of On-Site.com).
9. To the extent that these reports accurately reflect tenant-worthiness, landlords rightly
consider them a necessity when selecting tenants, and the reports are efficiency-enhancing
from an economic standpoint. See Benson & Biering, supra note 1, at 302; see also Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN
ANTHOLOGY 333 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984); Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain
Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 173, 174-76; Stauffer, supra note
2, at 270 & nn.141-42.
1o. See Foong, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., Brian Meyer, Taking Aim at Problem Tenants, Landlords: Training Programs for Both
Suggested, BUFFALO NEws (N.Y.), Dec. 26, 2oo6, at Bi ("[A city council member] thinks
many neighborhoods would see improved conditions if problem landlords were required to
attend sessions that focus on screening tenants, recognizing signs of drug activity and the
eviction process."); Leonor Vivanco, For Some, Apartments Mean Crime, INLAND VALLEY
DAILY BULL. (Ontario, Cal.), Oct. 9, 20o6, at Bi ("City officials said a police-administered
crime-free, multi-housing program to train apartment managers on tenant screening and
evictions as well as design standards to reduce the possibility of crime is working.").
1347
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
believe that there are items that these reports should and should not include.
An actual eviction for nonpayment of rent would be a legitimate item, but an
unmeritorious lawsuit brought by a landlord solely for "arm-twisting" would
not.'
2
Errors in tenant-screening reports-the first problem noted above-arise
from the practical limitations in the methods agencies use to compile their
reports 13 as well as from a market that tolerates or even rewards inaccuracy in
the direction of overinclusive reports. And even accurate reports can be
misleading. For example, most eviction actions end in settlement, 4 yet
judgment routinely enters in the landlord's favor for procedural reasons,'"
meaning that a report might appear more negative than it should. 6
Furthermore, many court records are either unclear or simply incomplete with
regard to the disposition of cases. 7
12. Legislatures routinely make such value judgments in other consumer reporting contexts. For
example, federal law prohibits credit reports from mentioning a bankruptcy that is more
than ten years old. See I5 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(i) (2000). Indeed, these normative
commitments are the most plausible legislative intent that can be inferred from recent
amendments to California's law prohibiting the dissemination of eviction records if the
tenant prevails in court. See infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Subsection I.B.1.
14. See, e.g., Spector, supra note 2, at 185; see also infra note 45 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Spector, supra note 2, at 185 ("A study in the District of Columbia reported that
although most of the 69,000 [eviction] complaints filed in 1989 resulted in negotiated
settlements prior to trial, courts routinely entered a judgment for the landlords." (citing
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: INFORMATION ON COURT-
ORDERED TENANT EVICTIONS 14 (199o), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d21t9/
143093.pdf)).
If a settlement does not work out, the landlord usually can evict her tenant more quickly
if judgment already entered in the landlord's favor under the stipulated agreement. See, e.g.,
Steven Gunn, Note, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly Compassion or Justice Served?, 13
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 385, 427 (1995) (describing how settlements typically work in
Connecticut); SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, A LANDLORD'S GUIDE
TO SUMMARY PROCESS (EVICTION) 8 (2004), http://www.jud2.ct.gov/webforms/
PublicationsAandlordguide.pdf.
16. At least one state supreme court identified these "collateral" effects on rental prospects as
sufficient cause to revisit an eviction case and reopen such a judgment. In Housing Authority
v. Lamothe, 627 A.2d 367 (Conn. 1993), the court allowed a defendant who had stipulated to
an eviction judgment (and had moved out) to reopen that judgment over an objection of
mootness. The court held that allowing the judgment to stand would have "potentially
prejudicial collateral consequences to the defendant"-in particular, it "could have [a]
lasting negative impact upon her ability to be eligible for low income subsidized housing."
Id. at 371.
17. A Westlaw search of the "ud-all" and "Is-all" databases revealed that, while some court
records provided plenty of information about disposition, others provided very little. These
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Second, screening reports are open to abuse not only because they make the
threat of an eviction action a stronger tool for disciplining tenants (because the
action will be "reported") but also because the item on the report is
fundamentally a description of the landlord's actions' 8 (whether she filed an
eviction) instead of the tenant's actions. ' 9 Reports of such abuse are frequent in
the media and in scholarship on tenant-screening reports.20 The following
"advisory" letter from a landlord to a tenant demonstrates the opportunity for
abuse inherent in tenant-screening reports:
[W]e now subscribe to a service that records all filings on [eviction]
actions. As this service is used by landlords, it will be impossible, in the
future, to rent an apartment if you have been served a legal action. We
are advising you of this, as the failure to pay your rent on time[] will
result in your name being placed in the file, and you will be unable to
secure any apartment in the future.2"
While that threat might sound exaggerated, recent press accounts suggest that
it is not. In New York City, vacancy rates are low (less than 1%) and landlords
"can afford to be picky."" A recent New York Times article stated that at least
20% of apartment applicants in Manhattan received a "reject" rating from a
two databases represent "unlawful detainer" (eviction) filings for many states and lawsuit
filings for many more states, although they are by no means complete even for the states
included.
18. The fact that landlords can act unilaterally to blacklist a tenant distinguishes tenant-
screening reports from other reports that seek to establish a person's honesty or reputation,
such as credit reports.
19. It does not appear that other kinds of landlord-tenant disputes, such as over housing
conditions, are typically included on tenant-screening reports.
2o. Tenant-screening reports effectively allow landlords to "blacklist" a tenant unilaterally. See,
e.g., Benson & Biering, supra note i, at 308 n.48, 309 n.57 (citing two examples of
journalistic coverage in the late 1970s); Williams, supra note 2, at 1o82 n.17 (collecting news
articles about privacy and tenant-screening agencies or reporting practices); Stauffer, supra
note 2, at 265-67; Dennis Hevesi, When the Credit Check Is Only the Start, N.Y. TimEs, Oct.
12, 2003, 5 11 (Real Estate), at 1; Motoko Rich, A Blacklistfor Renters, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8,
2004, at Fi; Rogers, supra note 8 ("Renters are presumed litigious if they stopped paying
rent to a slumlord or even if they acquired a court record by mistake."); CBS Evening News:
Landlords Blacklist Former Tenants (CBS television broadcast May 21, 2004) ("It happens
more than you may know. The landlord threatens to evict you; you settle and stay. But the
story doesn't end there. When you decide to move, no one will take you as a new tenant.").
21. Benson & Biering, supra note i, at 301.
22. Rogers, supra note 8.
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tenant-screening agency and, furthermore, that "a history of litigation against a
prior landlord usually triggers automatic disqualification. '23
Finally, tenant-screening reports may be contrary to established public
policy because, while many legislatures have passed laws to protect tenant
rights during disputes with their landlord,24 these reports punish a tenant who
chooses to vindicate those rights in court. Legislatures also have regulated
consumer reports to improve accuracy,25 but those regulations alone do not
prevent the misleading items that are swept up in overinclusive reports. And
even if the tenant successfully invokes the protections granted by the legislature
and wins the summary process action, her mere involvement in an eviction
action might significantly diminish her future chances of finding housing.6
Three strategies have evolved to deal with the problems of tenant-screening
reports and credit reports in general. The first strategy is to require that any
disseminated information be accurate. Failing that, the second strategy is for
legislatures simply to prohibit reporting agencies from disseminating certain
types of information regardless of whether it is accurate. The third strategy-
the least common but the one I ultimately endorse -is to restrict the release of
government records to the reporting agencies in the first place.
Most legislatures regulating tenant-screening reports have focused on the
first strategy of ensuring the accuracy of the information disseminated by
reporting agencies. At the federal level, even though it focuses primarily on
credit reports, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) already provides
mechanisms for tenants to correct errors, 7 including the right to be informed
23. Id.
24. For example, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act recognizes an implied
warranty of habitability and allows tenants involved in an eviction action to counterclaim if
the premises are uninhabitable. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (URLTA)
§§ 2.104, 4.105 (1974), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bl/ulc/fnact99/1q7os/urlta72.pdf.
According to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, twenty-
one states have adopted the URLTA. Unit Law Comm'rs, A Few Facts About the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-
factsheets/uniformacts-fs-urlta.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
25. See infra Section II.A.
26. Relatively few good empirical studies exist on evictions, see infra note 39 and accompanying
text, and even less research exists on the impact of tenant-screening reports, with no studies
quantifying the effect of negative items on a tenant's future rental prospects, see, e.g.,
HousingLink, Tenant Screening Agencies in the Twin Cities: An Overview of Tenant
Screening Practices and Their Impact on Renters 41 (2004), http://www.housinglink.org/
adobe/reports/TenantScreening.pdf (recommending "a study to identify the type and
extent of inaccuracies in tenant screening reports," and noting that "it is likely that a study
of this nature would have value beyond the Twin Cities").
27. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-i68ix (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see also infra Section II.A.
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of decisions that rely on an adverse report, to obtain a copy of the report, to
dispute items, and to add notes to their files.28 Yet tenants usually do not learn
of erroneous information in their tenant-screening reports until after they have
been denied housing, limiting the usefulness of these measures.' 9 Moreover,
abuse remains a problem, and public policy goals are still frustrated.
States also have pursued the second strategy-prohibiting agencies from
disseminating certain types of information. For example, California passed a
law in the early 198os prohibiting tenant-screening agencies from reporting on
eviction actions unless the tenant lost in court.30 But this approach forces states
to strike a difficult balance between First Amendment values on the one hand
and empowering tenants on the other. 1 The approach also may be ineffective;
one tenant-screening agency announced its intent to circumvent the California
law by not disseminating the prohibited information and instead simply
opining that landlords should "reject this applicant."3"
This Note endorses the third strategy of having courts withhold
information on eviction actions until the landlord prevails in court-an
approach that has been used in California for more than fifteen years. 3 It has
aS. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c(f), 168ii, 1681j(b). As elaborated infra Part II, however, those rights are
largely insufficient to meet the problems that tenant-screening reports create.
29. See, e.g., Richard Lee Colvin, Court Limits Data in Eviction Cases That Firm Can Tell to
Landlords, L.A. TiMEs (Valley ed.), May 31, 1989, § 2 (Metro), at 8 ("Her efforts were being
thwarted, unbeknown[st] to her, by a report on file with a Van Nuys landlord information
service....").
30. See infra Subsection II.B.i.
31. A California appellate court ruled that the First Amendment's free speech guarantees
trumped other policy goals and held that this law was unconstitutional. See infra note 114
and accompanying text; see also Sheinkopf, supra note 2. But see David Pallack, California
Perspectives on Tenant-Screening Agencies, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 343,
343-45 (2oo5) (suggesting that recent changes in the California Supreme Court's
interpretation of commercial speech have altered the legal foundation for that holding and
that the law, which has stayed on the books, is arguably once again constitutional).
32. Pallack, supra note 31, at 343 n.4 (emphasis omitted). Such an evaluation could be even more
damaging when landlords rely exclusively on the tenant-screening reports. Some landlords
do this because they believe that tenant-screening reports provide an objective basis on
which to deny an application and avoid a fair housing lawsuit. The report's score "tells us
what to do and we do it. There is no discrimination as everyone is judged the same way
. ... " Foong, supra note 6 (quoting Diana Pittro, executive vice president of RMK
Management Corp.).
33. The California statute falls short in at least one respect: it only seals court records for sixty
days after the initiation of the action (unless the tenant prevails within that period, in which
case the records are permanently sealed). See infra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
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also been endorsed by a judge in that state34 and suggested, in the abstract, by
the Supreme Court.3" But thus far the strategy has received little scholarly
discussion,36 and no other states have pursued this approach.
The strategy of limiting access to sensitive information would be more
effective at curtailing abuse than an accuracy-based approach, while it poses
fewer constitutional issues than does a censorship-based approach. Under this
proposal, it would become logistically easier for tenant-screening agencies to
document cases in which landlords prevailed than those in which tenants
prevailed or the parties settled. 37 But courtrooms would remain open and their
records available to the parties in eviction lawsuits, their designees, journalists,
and others upon a showing of good cause.
Part I of this Note describes the real-life effects of tenant-screening reports
and the abusive behavior they enable and engender. Part II discusses existing
statutes that seek to regulate these reports. Part III outlines the proposed
statutory strategy and offers reasons why such statutes would be theoretically
justified under principles of efficiency, privacy, legislative discretion, and
judicial discretion, as well as fairness and basic practical concerns. Part III also
examines parallels in the criminal context (in which records are often expunged
based on the outcome of the trial) and mounts a defense of outcome-based
record disclosure against criticisms that it would violate the First Amendment
or principles of open government.
34. See U.D. Registry v. State, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 232 (Ct. App. 1995) ("If the state is
concerned about dissemination of this [eviction record] information, it has the power to
control its initial release."); see also infra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
36. The little scholarship to consider the possibility of sealing court eviction records concludes
that "[i]n some federal districts, a statute banning access to civil court records, such as
unlawful detainer [i.e., eviction] records, would violate the First Amendment." Sheinkopf,
supra note 2, at 1603. Putting aside the question of whether Cheryl Sheinkopf is correct
about precedent in those circuits (she appears to have conflated access to civil proceedings
with access to civil records, see id. at 1603 & n.165), she is incorrect that sealing records in
certain types of cases "would violate the First Amendment," id. at 1603. That rule would be
inconsistent with the well-established practices of placing cases under seal and expunging
court records when other values (e.g., privacy, public safety, or fairness) justify it. See, e.g.,
infra notes 155-158, 179-188 and accompanying text.
37. Of course, tenant-screening agencies still would be free to learn about and report on other
eviction actions simply by communicating with landlords directly, but the added costs
would likely deter that behavior. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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I. EVICTIONS, TENANT SCREENING, AND THE PROBLEMS OF
TENANT-SCREENING REPORTS
A. The Realities of Eviction
Tenant-screening reports place great emphasis on past evictions, partly
because they are intuitively significant to landlords and partly because evictions
are easier to canvas than more detailed rental references. Though evictions have
not been the subject of much empirical research, the rental housing market is
dominated by low-income tenants, 3s and a few state and municipal studies
have shown that evictions disproportionately affect the poor, women, and
racial and ethnic minorities. 9 It stands to reason, then, that the nation's poor
and marginalized populations also suffer the brunt of the harm caused by
erroneous or abusive tenant-screening reports. 4' The effects of tenant-
screening reports are all the more difficult to measure because eviction
procedures themselves vary greatly from state to state.41 Given the scarcity of
empirical data, the following statistics draw almost exclusively from
Connecticut, both because I have been able to obtain court records on evictions
for this state and because New Haven evictions are among the best
documented in the country.
42
38. For example, fully 25% of rented housing units are occupied by households living below the
federal poverty level, and more than half of the occupants of rented housing earn less than
twice the poverty level. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv. & U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 226 & tbl.4 -12 (20o6),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/20o6pubs/h15o-o5.pdf.
39. See, e.g., Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 461, 467-68 (2003), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/
programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_14o4Thartman.pdf (collecting data from numerous localized studies
on eviction).
40. See id. at 461.
41. Simply identifying the court in which evictions are filed can be tricky. In Connecticut, for
example, most but not all evictions are filed in a special "Housing Session" of the superior
court that keeps all of its own records. See CONN. GEN. STAT. 5 47a-7o (2007). Other states
process evictions in the everyday municipal courts, and still others allow evictions with small
dollar amounts to proceed in small claims court. See MARCIA STEWART ET AL., EVERY
LANDLORD'S LEGAL GUIDE 396 (8th ed. 2006) (listing twenty states where landlords may file
eviction actions in small claims court or its equivalent).
42. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 15; Note, Legal Services and Landlord-Tenant Litigation: A Critical
Analysis, 82 YALE L.J. 1495 (1973); Robert Daines, Landlord-Tenant Litigation and the
Impact of Free Legal Services (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author);
Michael D. Gottesman, End Game: Understanding the Bitter End of Evictions (Dec. 20,
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Despite variation, eviction procedures in every state allow a landlord to
recover possession of the subject premises on an accelerated timeline as
compared with a normal civil case. For this reason, many eviction statutes are
called "summary process" statutes, although in some states the actions are also
known as "unlawful detainer" suits. Most evictions occur for nonpayment of
rent,43 but a landlord may seek a summary process remedy under other
conditions, such as holdover (when the lease has terminated but the tenant
remains on the premises), serious nuisance, and breach of lease provisions.
44
Just as in other kinds of litigation, the majority of landlords and tenants
end up settling their differences without a court decision. In Connecticut,
"nearly all contested cases are successfully settled." 4 (Of course, many are not
even contested.) The rest are mostly dismissed or withdrawn. In Connecticut,
judgments by default for failure to appear are the second most common
disposition, occurring in about one-third of cases, 46 and they might be even
more common in other states. 47 Defaults might be so frequent because tenants
move out and choose to ignore the summons or because they pay up and agree
43. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 15, at 389, 397 tbl.7 (citing an unpublished study that found that
97% of eviction actions were brought for nonpayment of rent, and reporting new findings
that nonpayment was alleged in 93% of cases in which the tenant was unrepresented and in
86% of cases in which the tenant was represented by a legal services organization).
44. However, "[t]he fact that the landlord has a right to terminate under the terms of the lease
and has elected to do so does not necessarily mean that he can avail himself of the summary
process statute." DAVID S. HILL, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 59 (4 th ed.
2004).
45. CITIZENs ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR Hous. MATTERS, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 4
(2oo5), http://www.ct.gov/ecd/lib/ecd/housing_reports/cac-20o5_fill-report.pdf (summarizing
"at least five detailed reports" over the last twenty years that measured processing speed and
outcomes in Connecticut housing cases).
46. For example, a survey I conducted of cases brought in Connecticut's specialized housing
courts found that, in their initial disposition, 39% were settled, 33% were won by the
landlord after the tenant failed to contest the matter (either by neglecting to file an
appearance in the case or by failing to appear on her actual court date), i1% were withdrawn,
7% were dismissed or dormant, and io% fell in other categories. See Rudy Kleysteuber,
Repeat Play in Connecticut Evictions: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis 18-19 (Jan.
26, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The survey spanned a time period
from when those courts began keeping their records electronically (ranging from March
1997 for the earliest adopter to June 2005 for the latest) through April 2006. Percentages
were calculated out of 79,754 total docket entries (3603 of which had no disposition coded
and were presumably still active). Other categories included judgment for the landlord,
judgment for the landlord via default for the tenant's failure to plead, transfer to another
court, sua sponte dismissal, and execution issued at trial.
47. See Hartman & Robinson, supra note 39, at 478 n.16 (collecting literature to show that
nearly half of all defendants default in California, 42% in Chicago, 35% in Hartford, and 31%
in Massachusetts).
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with landlords to ignore the court filings. Stipulated settlement is the most
common method of disposition, but these settlements usually enter as
judgments for the landlord. Even though landlords received a judgment in
their favor in more than 75% of all cases, they pursued that judgment to
execution (actual removal of the tenant) less than one-third of the time.
48
The fact that such a low percentage of cases ends in execution illustrates an
important point: even though a judgment was entered in the landlord's favor,
the dispute may have ended on amicable terms. Landlords often will file a
summary process action to command the tenant's attention and effect a quick
resolution. When the parties stipulate to a judgment in the landlord's favor,
the landlord is entitled to a quick eviction if the tenant does not keep her word.
The original dispute-whether about unpaid rent, damage or nuisance, or a
simple lease violation-is therefore resolved to the landlord's satisfaction. This
is why many landlords, such as housing authorities, file an eviction as soon as a
rental payment is late, even if they have no expectation of seeing the eviction
through: they simply want insurance in case the tenant's late payment is part
of a larger problem. Once the tenant pays up (with a penalty, perhaps, for
court filing fees), she could be reinstated as a tenant in good standing.
Indeed, perhaps so few cases end in eviction because landlords use the
process (except when filing fees are too high) simply to apply more pressure on
a tenant to pay her rent. The threat of eviction is thus "a way to up the ante to
let the tenant know that [landlords] are serious," although "[fi]n most of those
cases, [tenants] work out some agreement to begin paying."49
48. An execution is an order authorizing removal unless the tenant vacates before the marshal
can come. Out of all the cases in my dataset, the status field for only 20.4% indicated that
the case was "Disposed: Execution Issued." See Kleysteuber, supra note 46. It appears that
the "disposition" field is intended to capture the legal disposition of the case, while the
"status" field is intended to capture the current state of the proceedings. Thus, while 0.2% of
cases have a disposition of "Disposed: Execution Issued," whereby the housing judge issued
an execution as part of the judgment, 20.4% of all cases eventually reached a status of
"Disposed: Execution Issued."
In Connecticut, judgments entered in the landlord's favor usually are accompanied by
an automatic five-day stay of execution, after which the landlord or her agent must appear
personally in the clerk's office and obtain the execution order (as long as the tenant has not
applied for an additional extension of time). SUPERIOR COURT, supra note 15, at 7-8.
49. Rebecca Webber, Evictions, GOTHAM GAzETTE (N.Y.), Nov. 12, 2001,
http://www.gothamgazette.conViotw/affordhousing/doci.shtml (quoting Frank Ricci,
director of governmental affairs for the Rent Stabilization Association of New York City).
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B. Tenant Screening and Its Problems
Although tenant-screening reports often take tenants by surprise,
landlords -especially professional or experienced ones-are generally quite
familiar with themS°: "Many landlords find it essential to check a prospective
tenant's credit history with at least one credit reporting agency .... ""
In addition to the nationally known credit reporting agencies, scores of
companies of varying sizes claim to cull local court records and build tenant-
screening databases to offer a landlord insight into a tenant's desirability. 2
Although some of these databases purport to contain positive payment history
information for tenants who pay their rent on time," these screening reports
are widely recognized as vehicles for almost exclusively negative information
about the person under investigation. 4 A typical tenant-screening report
includes a standard credit report (with information about missed or late
payments to creditors, money judgments, and bankruptcies, among other
things), a criminal background check, and a listing of possible eviction actions
against the individual (either local or national in scope)."5
The largest of the tenant-screening report companies appears to be First
Advantage SafeRent, 6 which now owns California's U.D. Registry and other
tenant-screening firms that once operated on a regional basis.s7 First Advantage
has at least forty offices nationwide, and "[m]ore than 30,000 properties,
5o. The first chapter of a popular legal self-help guide for landlords, for example, is titled
"Screening Tenants: Your Most Important Decision." STEWART ET AL., supra note 41, at 5.
51. Id. at 17; see supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
52. For an outdated but extensive list of tenant-screening companies, see U.S. Pub. Interest
Research Group, PIRG Identity Theft II: Return to the Consumer X-Files app. B (Sept.
1997), http://www.pirg.org/reports/consumer/xfiles/app-b.htm.
53. See infra note 81 for one example.
54. More than one state legislature has recognized this fact. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3571.1.L (Supp. 20o6) (exempting from certain "security freeze" requirements that apply
to credit reports "[a]ny database or file which consists solely of any information adverse to
the interests of the consumer, including.., tenant screening"); see also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 367.364 (West Supp. 20o6) (using virtually identical language).
55- See HousingLink, supra note 26, at 19.
56. See First Advantage SafeRent, http://www.registry-saferent.com (last visited Mar. 27,
2007). First Advantage Registry, as it also is known, was the subject of a class action lawsuit
in New York. See supra note 5; infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. Note that First
Advantage SafeRent is only one of First Advantage's divisions.
57. For a sense of how many tenant-screening firms First Advantage has acquired, see First
Advantage SafeRent, Press Releases, http://www.fadvsaferent.com/news/press-releases/
index.php (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
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representing over 6 million apartment homes, count on Registry-SafeRent
every day to help them attain the highest quality residents and maximize
profitability.", 8 Its subsidiary U.D. Registry has been both a plaintiff in
lawsuits to protect its method of producing tenant-screening reportss9 and a
defendant in several lawsuits by individuals dissatisfied with their listings in
the database. 6' The oldest of the tenant-screening companies appears to be
Minnesota's Rental Research Services, Inc., 6 ' and it too has been the subject of
a federal lawsuit. 62 Countless other tenant-screening services are listed on the
Internet, although some or many of these services might merely resell reports
obtained through a larger company like First Advantage.
Several law review articles have discussed these reports,6 3 identifying many
problems.6 4 Some of the most salient concerns include error in the reports,
abuse of the reporting system by landlords, and frustration of valid public
policy objectives.6 s I discuss each of these in turn.
58. First Advantage SafeRent, Press Release, Registry-SafeRent and the Houston Apartment
Association's Resident Credit Reporting Service Partner To Expand Screening Services (May 3,
2005), http://www.fadvsaferent.com/news/press releases/pressrelease template.php?ID= 1103.
59. See, e.g., U.D. Registry, Inc. v. State, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Ct. App. 1995); see also Williams,
supra note 2, at 1O89 & nn.72-77, 1o9o & nn.78-86; Sheinkopf, supra note 2, at 1572-77, 1589-
90.
60. See, e.g., Marino v. UDR, No. CV-o 5 -2268, 2006 WL 1687026 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2006);
Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313 (Ct. App. 2002) (involving a
challenge to, among other things, a reporting agency's refusal to remove a listing of an
eviction action that was retaliatory and that the landlord had settled by paying the tenant
$5ooo); Cisneros v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233 (Ct. App. 1995). There is irony
in the possible inference that companies merely involved in lawsuits are more likely to have
engaged in abusive practices, given that my statutory proposal seeks to eliminate the same
kind of inference on the part of landlords and tenant-screening agencies.
61. The company has been operating since 1969. Rental Research Servs., The Original Resident
Screening Agency, http://www.rentalresearch.com/resident-screening/about-us.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2007).
62. See Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., 165 F.3d 642 (8th Cir.), affd by an equally divided
court, 206 F.3d 81o (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
63. See, e.g., Benson & Biering, supra note 1; Randy G. Gerchick, No Easy Way Out: Making the
Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41
UCLA L. REv. 759, 787-89 (1994); Spector, supra note 2, at 181-86; Williams, supra note 2;
Stauffer, supra note 2.
64. For a list of these problems, see, for example, Benson & Biering, supra note i, at 307-12; and
Stauffer, supra note 2, at 247-68.
65. The recent memorandum approving the settlement in White v. First American Registry, Inc.,
described these problems succinctly:
As [tenant-screening agencies] doubtless well understand, risk averse landlords
are all too willing to use defendants' product as a blacklist, refusing to rent to
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1. Errors and Misleading Information
Tenant-screening reports have two major information-related problems:
errors (mismatching) and omitted or misleading information. Mismatching
occurs because names are often used as the primary index for the eviction
histories included in tenant-screening reports.66 Common names only
exacerbate the problem, 67 as in other contexts, such as federal immigration.68
anyone whose name appears on it regardless of whether the existence of a
litigation history in fact evidences characteristics that would make one an
undesirable tenant. Thus, defendants have seized upon the ready and cheap
availability of electronic records to create and market a product that can be, and
probably is, used to victimize blameless individuals. The problem is compounded
by the fact that the information available to defendants from the New York City
Housing Court ("NYCHC") is sketchy in the best of cases and inaccurate and
incomplete in the worst. Any failure by defendants to ensure that the information
they provide is complete, accurate, and fair heightens the concern- and there has
been ample reason for heightened concern.
No. 04 Civ. 1611, 2007 WL 703926 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007) (footnote omitted). These
concerns are also summarized supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Richard Lee Colvin, Suit Hinges on Tenant-Screening Service's Accuracy, L.A. TM.ES
(Valley ed.), July S, 1989, § 2 (Metro), at 8 ("[O]nly about 2% of landlord inquiries result in
a positive link between a tenant and a past eviction case."); Willard Woods, Legislature
Considers Bills on Tenant-Screening, STAR TRiB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 27, 1993, at 7H
("Sometimes, applicants with common names are mistaken by screening services for
nonpaying tenants with the same name .... "). Mismatches occur even with credit reports,
for which items are supposed to be uniquely indexed by Social Security number. See Hevesi,
supra note 20 (describing a judgment against TransUnion, a major credit reporting
company). In a study focused entirely on tenant-screening reports, a Minnesota nonprofit
interviewed many professionals "who work on behalf of tenants" and found that the
"[p]resence of errors was the most common problem cited in the interviews." HousingLink,
supra note 26, at 5. Furthermore, "[r]eports that contain information that doesn't belong to
the tenant was the most frequently cited type of error. This type of error is a particular
problem for people with common names." Id.
67. I conducted a separate empirical study on evictions in Connecticut, during the course of
which I searched court records to identify repeat players. Using names to find repeat players
led to misleading results: for example, over the last ten years, "Carmen Rivera" has been
served with an eviction complaint in Connecticut at least fifty times. Inspecting individual
eviction records shows that people sharing the same name are included together. See
Kleysteuber, supra note 46. False negatives also can occur, as when salient facts such as
criminal history are mistakenly omitted from a tenant-screening report. See Thomas v.
Friends Rehab. Program, Inc., No. Civ.A.o 4 -4 288, 2005 WL 1625054, at "1 (E.D. Pa. July 11,
2005) (detailing the factual claims of a tenant who alleged she was kidnapped, raped, and
stabbed in her apartment complex by a neighbor whose tenant-screening report had
erroneously omitted his "lengthy criminal history," which included violent crimes and sex
crimes).
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Tenant-screening agencies are thus forced to choose between, on the one hand,
producing an overinclusive report that contains all the name matches for a
person in a particular area and, on the other hand, filtering the data using other
variables, resulting in a potentially underinclusive report that might omit
important past evictions. Because tenant-screening agencies are not required to
keep public records on complaints or corrections, it is impossible to know
whether these kinds of errors turn up frequently. A recent study by a
Minnesota nonprofit organization that surveyed social workers and other
service providers identified "errors" as the most common complaint about
tenant-screening reports.6"
Tenant-screening agencies have been largely unwilling to disclose the steps
they take to match names with court records.70 Among those that have done so,
there is no consensus on how to control for the problem of tenants with the
same name-or, indeed, on whether there should be any control.7 ' Two states
have enacted statutes that recognize the mismatching problem and that
encourage landlords to include uniquely identifying information in eviction
complaints filed with the court: Minnesota asks tenant-screening services and
courts to provide the tenant's date of birth when available, 72 and Oregon states
that "[t]he plaintiff may include, at the plaintiff's option, the defendant's
Social Security number in the complaint for the purpose of accuracy in tenant
screening information.""
68. Any kind of "blacklist" can be error-prone, especially if names are the primary index. For
example, the federal government has had great trouble implementing an employment-
screening system that tries to identify illegal immigrants using mismatches between 1-9
forms, Social Security data, and Department of Homeland Security records. See Annie
Decker, Aligning Immigration and Workplace Law, One Step at a Time, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 120, 121-22 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2oo6/os/decker.htm ("Although
many no-match letters correctly highlight unauthorized work, inevitable glitches such as
typos, name changes, and Spanish-surname confusions have caused high error rates.").
69. See supra note 66.
70. See, e.g., E-mail from Renee Svec, Dir. for Corp. Mktg. & Commc'ns, First Advantage
Corp., to author (Nov. 9, 20o6, lO:59 :24 EST) (on file with author) (citing a "need to focus
their media efforts on industry trade publications").
p. In HousingLink's Minnesota study, tenant-screening agencies of varying size were
interviewed about their reporting practices. The results were highly instructive: each service
uses a different method to match names to evictions records, with varying degrees of
exclusivity. "Rental Research, Inc., the largest agency in the study, uses eviction data from
45 states and provides a list of all of the names that come up during a search. They provide a
disclaimer that it is a name match only." HousingLink, supra note 26, at 21-22.
72. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
73. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 105.123(2) (West 2005). This provision is somewhat toothless unless
the landlord has the Social Security number from other sources. Furthermore, the statute
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Although controlling for at least some kinds of errors should be possible,
economic incentives exist against tenant-screening agencies' performing those
checks. After all, tenants who know their rights, and especially tenants who
defend their rights in court, probably will pose a higher potential cost to
landlords than tenants who do not. Thus, landlords would prefer to pay for
overinclusive, rather than underinclusive, reports.
The second major kind of defect in these reports-omitted or misleading
information-can be the fault of either tenant-screening agencies or the
original courthouses that provided the public record information in the first
place. 74 Tenant-screening reports often mention a tenant's involvement in an
eviction action without distinguishing among kinds of outcomes, such as a
tenant's (i) being evicted; (2) prevailing against her landlord; (3) settling with
a stipulated judgment in the landlord's favor; or (4) failing to appear in court
but not being evicted.
In fact, a large class action lawsuit was brought against First Advantage for
precisely this reason. After being denied an apartment, the plaintiff, Adam
White, received a copy of his tenant-screening report, which stated that he had
been involved in an eviction proceeding; instead of indicating a disposition, the
record merely said "case filed."7' The landlord had indeed "filed" an action after
"does not require a tenant to have a Social Security number in order to enter into a rental
agreement." Id.
74. See HousingLink, supra note 26, at 23 ("Overall, the [tenant-screening] agencies interviewed
felt that they are very select about what they report and that their reports are accurate. At the
same time, though, they expressed dissatisfaction with the quality and format of data from
public records. One agency representative stated that he feels most of the weaknesses in
tenant screening come from the data and that they are only as good as the data they
receive.").
75. See First Amended Class Action Complaint app. at 1, White v. First Am. Registry, 230
F.R.D. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo5) (No. 04 Civ. 1611). As mentioned supra note 5, the parties in
this action recently agreed to a settlement that will significantly alter the way First American
Registry, now First Advantage SafeRent, creates reports. According to one source, a draft of
the settlement agreement included "major changes," such as the following:
* Reports will include the actual disposition of all eviction cases;
* Reports will highlight the absence of any activity for at least 12 months in
eviction cases abandoned by landlords;
* [First American Registry, Inc.] will expunge cases from its database that
were found to be without merit or which were brought in error;
* Reports will contain a prominent notice advising prospective landlords that
the fact an eviction proceeding was brought does not represent an adverse
disposition or that the tenant was evicted.
Posting of 23:07 EST, TenantNet Forum, Apr. 4, 2oo6, http://tenant.net/phpBB2/
viewtopic.php?p=3552#3552; see also Declaration of Andrew P. Bell in Support of Joint
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement, Exhibit i, White, 23o F.R.D. 365 (No. 04
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White had withheld two months' rent because of a dispute, yet the action had
been dismissed "the first time the eviction proceeding appeared on the court
calendar," because the landlord failed to appear to prosecute the complaint.
76
Anecdotal evidence suggests that complaints of such misleading items have
been and continue to be relatively commonplace. 77
2. Abuse
In addition to containing mismatched or misleading information, tenant-
screening reports can be a vehicle for abusing tenants. As noted above,
landlords may threaten that tenants will be "unable to secure any apartment in
the future."T7 Because appearing on a tenant report may be equivalent to being
on a blacklist, "[a]fter learning that an eviction record may handicap his ability
to locate new housing, the rational tenant will more seriously consider working
with the landlord to avoid the eviction process. '79 Landlords can abuse their
Civ. 1611), available at http://www.tenantreportsetdement.com/setdement.pdf. Yet the
district judge found these changes to be inadequate and, in the words of one attorney for the
plaintiffs, sent the litigants back to the discussion table to try to "see if we can revise certain
provisions that provide stronger programmatic changes in the defendant's business
practices." Posting of 07:43 EST, TenantNet Forum, June 24, 20o6, http://tenant.net/
phpBB2/viewtopic.php?p=25oo9#25oo9 (quoting plaintiffs' attorney James B. Fishman);
see also Telephone Interview with Seth R. Lesser, Partner, Locks Law Firm, in New York,
N.Y. (Nov. 1, 20o6).
It is unclear if the final agreement included any further provisions. However, in a
memorandum opinion that accompanied his order approving the final settlement, the judge
again expressed his discomfort.
I am troubled by this settlement. It leaves defendants' business model essentially
intact. While there will be very modest improvements, the potential for abuse
quite plainly remains. The fact that defendants are willing, indeed anxious, to
engage in activities that are bound to harm innocent people is distressing....
Nevertheless, substantial factors point in favor of approval. To begin with, I
acknowledge that my discomfort stems in part from defendants' business model,
which in and of itself is not unlawful, however distasteful and deserving of
legislative attention it may be.
White v. First Am. Registry, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1611, 2007 VWL 703926, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2007).
76. First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 75, 31.
77. See David Frenznick, "Tenant Check" Lists the Undesirable-and the Innocent, L.A. TIMEs, Apr.
13, 1982, pt. i, at 3; see also supra note 66 (discussing the HousingLink study).
78. Benson & Biering, supra note 1, at 301.
79. Gerchick, supra note 63, at 789; see also id. (stating without critique that "[o] ne important
means of avoiding the eviction process is for the landlord to ... warn the tenant of the
negative ramifications of losing an unlawful detainer lawsuit").
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power to initiate an eviction action (and thus blacklist a tenant) to extort
compliance or cooperation, or simply to avoid being taken to court on other
grounds (such as a housing conditions complaint). Tenant-screening reports
are similar to blacklists in that the landlord has unilateral control over whether
a tenant will appear in a tenant-screening report, and this determination
provides no due process.s ° Even if a tenant has done nothing wrong, once a
landlord files for an eviction, that mark may appear on the report.
Landlords can also provide "opinions" about tenants.8' Although the
companies accused of collecting such information have denied this claim in
court depositions, competitors have claimed that this voluntarily reported
information includes descriptions of personal habits and other irrelevant
information:
For years [U.D. Registry] used to report life-style information about
tenants' political affiliations, who comes and goes, stuff that has
nothing to do with [tenants'] performance as tenants and payment of
rent. 
82
Although some commentators have suggested that this practice is less common
today,8 3 a recent New York Times article noted that landlords can still, "at least
through one company[,] ...examine previous landlords' assessments of a
tenant's habits: noisy? destructive? litigious? drug using?,,
8
,
8o. There is, of course, the ex post "due process" afforded by accuracy laws such as the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, discussed infra note 9o and accompanying text, but there is nothing
inaccurate about a landlord's deciding arbitrarily to blacklist a tenant and then filing an
eviction action to achieve that goal.
81. Rental Research Services has collected information on tenants for more than thirty-five
years in its voluntary Residential Occupancy Performance Report (ROPR) database. In
advertising its service, the company has noted that some "problem renters never make it to
the eviction stage. By providing a resource for landlords and apartment complexes to file
specific information on their residents, the ROPR database can help fill in the gaps for those
problem renters who did not have an eviction filed against them." Rental Research Servs., Inc.,
Instant Inquiry, http://www.rentalresearch.con/resident-screening/resident-screening.htm
(last visited Mar. 27, 2007) (noting that the database also includes positive rental history to
obviate the need for a reference check).
82. Colvin, supra note 66 (quoting Grady Robertson, president of U.D. Registry's main
competitor); see id. ("In court depositions, [principals at U.D. Registry] have denied that
the firm ever gathered such information. But several industry sources said it was widely
known that, at least in the past, the registry asked landlords for such information on
tenants.").
83. See, e.g., id.
84. Hevesi, supra note 20.
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3. Frustration of Legislative Objectives and Public Policy
Tenant-screening reports also frustrate legislatively endorsed public
policies in several ways. First, because of their susceptibility to error, they may
distort the rental housing market,8s the efficient operation of which is a
frequent legislative concern. Tenants who are perfectly qualified to rent an
apartment must pay higher rents and deposits or are pushed out of the rental
housing market altogether simply because a tenant-screening report
exaggerates their risk of falling behind on rent or other problems. This effect is
exacerbated because those most likely to have an "innocent" eviction complaint
on their report-such as poor tenants who fall behind on rent but catch
themselves up and stave off eviction-are the least likely to have the skills or
resources necessary to correct those entries or to pay the (unnecessary) risk
premiums that will ensue.
Second, because tenant-screening reports function effectively as blacklists,
they attach excessive stigma to involvement in the legal process and thus
discourage tenants from vindicating the very rights that legislatures have gone
to great pains to protect, and courts to enforce. Finally, unlike court records
themselves, which courts can expunge or seal, duplicates in private databases
culled from court records may live on immortal. Even worse, the copied
records probably will not reflect subsequent reversal on appeal, dismissal, or
sealing of the record.8 6
Indeed, landlords generally do not care who carries the blame in a
landlord-tenant dispute but only whether a dispute occurred: "[T]hey would
not rent to a prospective tenant who turns up in [a tenant-screening agency's]
files, regardless of what explanation the tenant gives.",8 As one tenant noted,
"activist" tenants are at particular risk of being blacklisted:
Landlords are surely not looking only for deadbeat tenants; a simple
credit report would turn them up.... Does the tenant tend to question
the landlord's orders? That's what the landlord wants to know. In our
case, the landlord ordered us out, claiming I could not succeed my
mother. I disputed that opinion, and it took the courts five years to
decide who was right. But in searching for a new home, I found myself
85. For an explication of this argument, see infra Subsection III.A.1.
86. Although the academic literature on tenant-screening reports does not discuss this problem,
a recent article in the New York Times recognized it in the context of criminal record
databases. See Adam Liptak, Criminal Records Erased by Courts Live To Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2006, at Al; see also infra note 97; infra note 188 and accompanying text.
87. Frenznick, supra note 77; see also Stauffer, supra note 2, at 245.
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blacklisted for not vacating voluntarily to spare the landlord the burden
88of proving the case in court.
II. TWO STRATEGIES FOR REGULATING TENANT-SCREENING
REPORTS: ENSURING ACCURACY AND LIMITING ACCESS
State and federal laws regulate reports concerning consumer "reputation"
(such as tenant-screening reports) primarily by providing incentives for
accuracy in reporting.89 The approach, discussed in Section A, was originally
developed for credit reporting but eventually extended to tenant-screening
reports. A neglected alternative, which I argue is necessary to an effective
regulatory scheme, is to restrict access to information that the state does not
wish to have disseminated. This would allow governments to prevent abusive
or misleading tenant-screening reports by sealing eviction actions by default
and allowing public access to court records only when doing so promotes
public policy objectives. That approach, which has been adopted only in
California, is discussed in Section B.
A. The Standard Approach: Ensuring Accuracy
With respect to tenant-screening reports, the accuracy-based approach has
been most widely and effectively adopted at the federal level, with the Fair
Credit Reporting Act 9° ensuring several crucial rights for tenants.9 ' A tenant
88. Vicki Richman, Landlords Blacklist Activist Tenants, SHELTERFORCE, July-Aug. 2002, at 19, 19,
available at http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/i24/blacklist.html.
89. A minor strand of all credit reporting regulation involves the "censorship" approach-
limiting, for example, the dissemination of information about debts more than seven years
old or about bankruptcies more than ten years old. See supra note 12; infra notes i1i-ii and
accompanying text.
9o. 15 U.S.C. § 1681-168ix (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). For a good overview of the FCRA's
provisions, see Fed. Trade Comm'n, A Summary of Your Rights Under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/credit/fcrasummary.pdf (last visited
Mar. 27, 2007).
91. Scholars seemed to have thought previously that it was an open question whether the FCRA
applied to tenant-screening reports. See Spector, supra note 2, at 18o (arguing that the FCRA
fails to address whether a "consumer report" includes a tenancy report, and citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(b)); Williams, supra note 2, at lO84-85 (describing judicial indecision over whether
the landlord-tenant relationship falls under "consumer credit"); see also Benson & Biering,
supra note 1, at 314-17; Stauffer, supra note 2, at 300-03 (discussing the applicability of the
FCRA to tenant-screening reports). Some authors, however, have cited the California state
case holding that the FCRA should apply to tenant-screening reports. See Cisneros v. U.D.
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must be informed when information in a screening report was used to decline a
rental application, charge a higher rent, or require a larger security deposit, and
she must be informed of her rights under the FCRA.9 2 For a limited period of
time, tenants may receive a copy of the report for free, and they may dispute
items that they claim are inaccurate. 93 Furthermore, screening agencies
considered to operate on a "nationwide" basis under the Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, 9 4 which amended the FCRA, are
subject to additional requirements-in particular, they must provide each
Registry, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233 (Ct. App. 1995); cf. Cotto v. Jenney, 721 F. Supp. 5, 6 (D.
Mass. 1989) ("[A] n examination of the purposes underlying the creation of the FCRA leads
this Court to conclude that the report prepared by [defendant] on plaintiff Cotto was indeed
a 'consumer report."').
Today, it seems clear that the FCRA applies to tenant-screening reports. First, the
amendments made by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003
explicitly extend regulation to "nationwide specialty consumer reporting agenc[ies]," which
include any "consumer reporting agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on
a nationwide basis relating to... residential or tenant history." Pub. L. No. lO8-159, sec. i11,
§ 603(w), 117 Stat. 1952, 1955 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(w)). The "nationwide" category
is meant to sweep broadly. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681x; Prohibition Against Circumventing
Treatment as a Nationwide Consumer Reporting Agency, 16 C.F.R. §§ 611.1-.3 (2006).
Second, even if a consumer reporting agency is not nationwide, guidelines published in 2001
by the Federal Trade Commission (which is charged with enforcing the FCRA under 15
U.S.C. § 1681g) instruct landlords on their obligations under the FCRA, presuming its
application. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Federal Trade Commission Issues
"Facts for Business" Guide on Complying with the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Jan. 15,
2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo2/oi/fcraguide.htm; Fed. Trade Comm'n, Using
Consumer Reports: What Landlords Need To Know (Dec. 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
conline/pubs/buspubsAandord.htm. Third, in 199o the FTC published a statement of
general policy that explicitly swept tenant-screening reports into the FCRA's regulatory
ambit. See Commentary on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,8o8, 18,8io (May
4, 199o). That statement is still in effect today. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 16 C.F.R. pt.
6oo app., § 6o 3(d), para. 6(F) (2005). While the statement does not have the binding legal
effect of a rule or regulation, courts look to it for guidance. See, e.g., Cisneros, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 242.
For an independent assessment, see Anthony Rodriguez, Tenant-Screening Agencies
Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. PovERTY L. & POL'Y 335
(2005).
92. The FTC has detailed examples of situations in which such notices are necessary, such as
when landlords are "[r]equiring a larger deposit than might be required for another
applicant; and [r]aising the rent to a higher amount than for another applicant." Fed. Trade
Comm'n, supra note 91.
93. Id.
94. 117 Stat. 1952. In particular, FACTA amended the FCRA definitions to include a new
category of "specialty" consumer reporting agencies that includes tenant-screening agencies.
Furthermore, the FTC has announced its intention that the "nationwide" label should not
be easily circumvented. See supra note 91.
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tenant upon request with a free copy of her report at least annually. 9s About
five years ago the FTC conducted a compliance review of residential apartment
owners in several major cities. The results "indicated substantial compliance,"
although "some landlords were not totally aware of some of the details of the
FCRA."
9 6
But even if the FCRA's provisions were universally understood and
followed, the Act would still fall short as a solution to the problems posed by
tenant-screening reports. First, the FCRA's approach is inefficient because
errors are corrected on an ex post, item-by-item basis. 97 Tenant-screening
agencies have little or no incentive to avoid accurate but misleading items
because enforcement is rare and punitive damages are largely unavailable.
9 8
Furthermore, many tenants -especially poorer tenants-may lack the time,
skills, documentation, or other resources needed to correct their files,
suggesting that these tenant-screening reports would contain an above-optimal
level of error, concentrated in the population that stands to suffer the most as a
result.9 9 Second, the accuracy remedy does nothing to solve the problem of
95. They appear to be subject to all requirements that pertain to any "consumer reporting
agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis," such as
Experian or Equifax. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(p).
96. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 91.
97. An ex ante solution, however, would avoid errors at the source. For example, requiring a
unique index such as a Social Security number or date of birth would avoid mismatched
entries on reports. See infra note 107 and accompanying text. Recall also that when an error
or misleading item enters public records it propagates immediately to screening agencies
that are as hard to find as the errors are to correct. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 7 ("With
local agencies in every part of the country, it's nearly impossible to review your records in
every database in the nation. Even locally there may be five or more of these agencies
keeping different sets of data, a credit reporting nightmare should a mistake turn up.");
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
98. The law also provides for civil suits for compensatory and punitive damages, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681n-i68io, but actions to enforce the rights granted under the FCRA seem to be the
exception rather than the rule, see Marino v. UDR, No. CV-o 5-2268, 2006 WL 1687026, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2006) (discussing the potential availability of statutory damages if a
tenant-screening agency's violations were found to be "willful," but failing to reach that
question after approving a settlement agreement); First Amended Class Action Complaint,
supra note 75 (seeking punitive damages in a class action suit); see also supra notes 60, 62.
99. For example, the FTC recently published the results of a pilot study as a precursor to a
nationwide study on the accuracy of credit reports, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681. See Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Report to Congress Under Section 319 of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003 (Dec. 20o6), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/FACTACT/
FACTActReport_2oo6.pdf. Although the statistical significance of the pilot was very
low - only thirty participants were solicited - two key themes emerged. First, even when
material errors were found in credit reports, "only 1 out of the 3 people who alleged material
errors subsequently (filed] a dispute." Id. at 4. Second, "people who did not have Internet
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abuse; a landlord can still strong-arm a tenant into submission simply by filing
a (frivolous) lawsuit, branding someone a "problem tenant" without any
evidence.
Even if flawed, the FCRA's value should not be underestimated. Without
it, tenants would be largely without recourse when trying to view and correct
the reports that concern them. However, the government can address the
problems of efficiency and abuse through additional regulations, as
demonstrated by key state laws.
States have granted some rights to tenants over and above those guaranteed
by federal law. Furthermore, because many tenant-screening agencies are
highly localized (avoiding interstate commerce), federal law may not apply to
some tenant-screening reports, meaning that state law might provide the only
remedies available. But states do not have to provide any such protection.
Indeed, New York entertained but rejected a proposal to consider tenant-
screening agencies a type of "consumer reporting agency" under the state's Fair
Credit Reporting Practice Act.' °°
The two states to have adopted significant statutes regulating the tenant-
screening industry are California and Minnesota,1"' and it may not be a
coincidence that these states are also the birthplaces of two prominent tenant-
screening agencies-U.D. Registry"°2  and Rental Research Services." 3
California's laws pursue various regulation strategies and are discussed below.
access or experience may have been less willing to participate" in the study, id., and Internet
access may well be critical in obtaining, researching, and disputing a credit report.
100. See Williams, supra note 2, at 1O85 n.41.
lol. See CAL. C]V. CODE §§ 1785.10-20 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
1161.2(a) (West Supp. 2007); Minnesota Tenant Reporting Act, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5o4B.235, .241, .245 (West 2002); see also Spector, supra note 2, at 185 & n.225, 186 &
nn.226-28; Williams, supra note 2, at 1O86-9o. Note that one important portion of the
Minnesota statute, requiring courts to "indicate on the court file ... the specific basis of the
court's decision," was repealed in 1999. Spector, supra note 2, at 186 & n.228.
A fifty-state survey of laws pertaining to credit reports and court records was beyond
the scope of this Note, but the literature on the subject has identified no other such laws.
Minnesota is currently considering a law that would standardize reports so that tenants
would only have to pay for one report within a specified period of time. H.R. 166, 2007
Leg., 85th Sess. (Minn. 2007), available at http://wdoc.house.leg.state.mn.us/eg/LS85/
HFo166.o.pdf. States have enacted laws that involve tenant-screening reports but that do
not regulate either the reports themselves or how tenant-screening agencies collect
information from court records. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 90.295 (2005) (specifying how a
landlord may collect and use a fee intended to pay for tenant-screening reports or services);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 59.18.257 (West 2004) (regulating what a landlord may charge a
prospective tenant to run a tenant-screening report).
1o2. See supra notes 56-57, 59-60 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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Minnesota's protections are far less extensive than California's, but they
also differ from the federally granted protections in a few interesting ways.
Minnesota's first law, passed in 1989, provided accuracy-enhancing rights
before the FTC interpreted the same grants to be protected by the FCRA in the
tenant-screening context. 0 4 Under Minnesota's law, tenants could inspect the
files of tenant-screening agencies, dispute the accuracy of items in the report,
and insert a comment into the record if they could not resolve the discrepancy
after an investigation.' The statute was amended in 1999,1"6 however, to
sweep even more broadly with respect to court records:
Whenever the court supplies information from a court file on an
individual, in whatever form, the court shall include the full name and
date of birth of the individual, if that is indicated on the court file or
summary, and information on the outcome of the court proceeding,
including the specific basis of the court's decision .. when it becomes
available. 107
Requiring the court records to mention the defendant's date of birth
significantly increases the likelihood that eviction actions will not be attributed
mistakenly to other individuals sharing the same name. Mandating that the
court records reflect the basis for decisions and that reports accurately
reproduce that basis also prevents a problem that can otherwise be corrected
after the fact under the FCRA and the California laws.
Minnesota also allows tenants who are sued in an abusive or frivolous
eviction to clear their names: in an eviction action in which the tenant prevails,
the court record may be expunged after the fact."°8 This provision is actually a
hybrid of measures to enhance the "accuracy" of court records (by removing
misleading items) and the access-limiting measures described in the following
Section. But it falls somewhat short as well: unlike outcome-based record
disclosure, expunction after the fact does not automatically clear a tenant's
name. As with criminal expunctions, copies of the court records already exist in
104. See supra note 91.
1OS. See An Act Relating to Community Development, ch. 328, art. 1, § 3-5, 1989 Minn. Laws
2350, 2360-62 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 5 o4B.241 subdiv. 2).
1o6. An Act Relating to Landlord and Tenant, ch. 199, art. 1, §§ 28-30, 1999 Minn. Laws 1078,
1094-96 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 5o4B.241 subdiv. 2).
107. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 5o4B.241 subdiv. 4.
1O8. See id. § 484.014; EDUCATION FOR JUSTICE, FACT SHEET H-27: EXPUNGING AN EVICTION CASE
(2oo6), http://www.lawhelpmn.org/documents/3981H-27%2oExpunging%2oEvictions.pdf.
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an unknown number of private databases, where records are hard to find and
tedious to change. °9
B. The Better Approach: Limiting Access
California was the first state to attempt an access-based solution to the
tenant-screening report problem; indeed, it was the first state to attempt to
regulate tenant-screening reports in any way whatsoever. The state passed two
major laws related to tenant-screening reports. The first attempt took a
censorship approach and forbade screening agencies from mentioning cases the
tenant won. This law is interesting primarily because it illuminates that
strategy's difficulties: a California court declared the law an unconstitutional
restraint on free speech, although this ruling may no longer apply.11°
Nine years later, however, a second law pursued for the first time an access-
based strategy that made eviction records confidential until the tenant lost or
until sixty days elapsed from filing without a victory for the tenant. The second
law is still on the books, and it serves as a prototype for the scheme that I
propose other states should follow.
1. California's First Attempt: Censoring Unfair Items
In 1982, the California legislature passed its first law to restrict the
dissemination of information contained in public records about evictions.
Specifically, the statute prohibited collecting and redistributing certain
information from court records."' The statute prevented tenant-screening
agencies from including "[u]nlawful detainer actions where the person against
whom the action was filed was adjudged the prevailing party.1 . 2
Moreover, this provision was focused on protecting the poor, as the
consumer credit report restrictions did not apply to reports sought in
connection with "[tIhe rental of a dwelling unit which exceeds one thousand
iog. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
i1o. See Pallack, supra note 31.
m. Act of Sept. 16, 1982, sec. 4, § 1785.13(a)(4), 1982 Cal. Stat. 4062, 4064 (codified as amended
at CAL. CIV. CODE 5 1785.13(a)(4) (West 1998)); see also Colvin, supra note 66 ("Another
dispute based on the [1982] legislation relates to what cases could be reported to
landlords.... Assemblyman Richard Katz (D-Sylmar), who authored unsuccessful legislation
... said it is unfair to allow [settled or withdrawn cases] to remain on a renter's record.").
The statute's language is similar to that of a 1979 statutory proposal intended to protect
tenants from abusive practices. See Benson & Biering, supra note 1, at 324-25.
112. Act of Sept. 16, 1982, sec. 4, § 1785.13(a)(4).
1369
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
dollars ($1,ooo) per month.""' 3 Yet in 1995 the California Court of Appeals
held this statute to be an unconstitutional First Amendment violation."14 As an
alternative, the court suggested to the California legislature the strategy that
the legislature ultimately pursued: "If the state is concerned about
dissemination of this information, it has the power to control its initial
release.""'
2. California's Second Attempt: An Access-Based Approach
In 1991, the California legislature passed a law that restricted the release of
court records in eviction actions. This approach, which I call "outcome-based
record disclosure," limited access to eviction records to the parties themselves
(or to others who met certain criteria) for thirty days after the filing of an
eviction action." 6 This limited period of nondisclosure has since been extended
to sixty days and provides permanent nondisclosure for tenants who prevail
during that window."1 7 Ironically, the originally stated legislative purpose
behind this thirty-day confidentiality rule had nothing to do with protecting
tenants from the negative effects of tenant-screening reports. Instead, this
provision apparently was created because eviction defense lawyers were
combing the eviction records to find potential clients and then soliciting them
directly."' Recent amendments suggest, however, that legislators have changed
113. Id. sec. 4, 5 178 5.13(b)( 4 ). This exemption was added contemporaneously with the inclusion
of tenant-screening reports in the credit report statute. Compare id., with Consumer Credit
Reporting Agencies Act, sec. 1, § 1785.13, 1975 Cal. Star. 3369, 3371-72 (codified as amended
at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.13). Although the statute does not account for inflation, the $1ooo
statutory limit in 1982 would amount to $2097.58 today, according to the CPI Inflation
Calculator. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
114. U.D. Registry, Inc. v. State, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Ct. App. 1995).
115. Id. at 232. The court's follow-up comment is even more compelling: "Where information is
entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than punishing truthful publication
almost always exists for guarding against the dissemination of private facts." Id. (quoting
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989)).
116. Act of Oct. 13, 1991, ch. 1007, 1991 Cal. Stat. 4686 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1161.2 (West Supp. 2007)).
117. Id. It is unclear why the statute effectively penalizes defendants who prevail but take longer
than sixty days to do so.
118. The motive to protect tenants from the solicitations of unscrupulous eviction defense
lawyers, rather than from screening reports, is clear not only from the preamble to the
statute but also from its legislative history. See Act of Oct. 13, 1991, § 1; Williams, supra note
2, at 1133 n.453; Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R 7.3(a) (2003) (noting that, with
certain exceptions, "[a] lawyer shall not ... solicit professional employment from a
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their views and that today the law's focus is on protecting tenants from
screening reports. The current text requires the permanent sealing of records
when tenants prevail quickly in eviction actions1 9 -a measure that provides no
appreciable relief from unscrupulous defense attorneys but that certainly helps
protect tenants from abusive screening reports and landlords.
Tenant-screening agencies, including U.D. Registry, have pledged to fight
laws that restrict access to court records, but two such challenges in the
California courts have failed, 2 ' and further challenges promised more than two
years ago'21 appear not to have materialized -possibly indicating the resiliency
of this approach compared with the strategy of censorship.
C. Why Accuracy Isn't Enough
To review, tenant-screening reports create various kinds of problems for
tenants. The people most likely to be evicted will have the hardest time fixing
the inevitable errors in their reports. The reports frustrate public policy by
punishing tenants who know and stand by their legal rights, and they allow
landlords to abuse tenants by branding them with an eviction action, whether
or not the action is brought in good faith, and whether or not they ultimately
resolve their differences out of court.
The substantive rights guaranteed by credit reporting laws such as the
FCRA and Minnesota's tenant-screening law are indispensable, encouraging
transparency in the credit reporting process and giving tenants a mechanism
prospective client when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain").
iig. The current code provides that:
(a) The clerk may allow access to limited civil case records filed under this
chapter, including the court file, index, and register of actions, only as follows:
(i) To a party to the action, including a party's attorney.
[(2)-(4) To individuals with certain credentials or anyone else who obtains
an order demonstrating "good cause."]
(5) To any other person 6o days after the complaint has been filed, unless a
defendant prevails in the action within 6o days of the filing of the complaint,
in which case the clerk may not allow access to any court records in the
action, except as provided in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.2.
120. See U.D. Registry, Inc. v. Mun. Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788, 790 (Ct. App. 1996); U.D.
Registry, Inc. v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363, 365 (Ct. App. 1995).
121. See Rich, supra note 20 ("Last year a law was approved in California requiring housing
courts to seal all eviction cases in which the tenant prevails. Mr. Saltz [founder and
president of U.D. Registry] said he plans to sue the state this year to overturn the law,
calling it unconstitutional.").
1371
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
for finding and correcting errors.' 22 However, such laws never will provide the
practical, technical barrier against abuse offered by California's 1995 law
providing for outcome-based record disclosure. More specifically, the FCRA
and similar state laws do not focus on creating systematic, efficient incentives
for accuracy and deterrents against abuse. These laws presume a market that is
already functioning optimally, and they tweak it only to fix occasional errors.
Pledging their allegiance to accuracy above all else, these laws do nothing to
prevent screening reports from including unfair items, such as an eviction
action filed against a tenant who ultimately prevailed in court.
My proposal reapplies the consumer protection instinct that motivates, for
example, the FCRA's seven-year limit on reporting items 123 and California's
1982 law: by releasing information in a controlled and careful way, states can
reinvigorate tenant resistance to evictions filed in bad faith, eliminate some
abuse, and even push down error rates.
III. A DEFENSE OF OUTCOME-BASED RESTRICTIONS
This Note argues that the best solution to the remaining problems of
tenant-screening practices and reports is to restrict the release of information
about summary process actions in the first place. At the heart of this proposal is
a balance between two countervailing values in our democracy -privacy for
individuals and openness in government. Layered into the debate between
privacy and openness are other values, such as free speech and the First
Amendment, practicality, economic and social efficiency, and normative
commitments to fairness and due process.
I propose that a legislative package with the following provisions would
strike the correct balance among these values in all fifty states:
(i) Court proceedings in eviction cases remain open to the public by
default;
(2) Records of nondisposed cases are sealed to the general public,
regardless of how long the cases remain without a disposition;
122. For example, in addition to seeking to protect fairness and accuracy along the lines of the
FCRA's congressional findings and statement of purpose, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004), the California legislature intended the Consumer Credit Reporting
Agencies Act to meet "the needs of commerce . . . with regard to the confidentiality,
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of [credit reports]," CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.1 (West
1998) (emphasis added).
123. 15 U.S.C. 5 1681c(a). The congressional findings that preface the FCRA provide no
justification for such limitations. See id. § 1681.
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(3) Court records are open to any party to the case, as well as to
nonparties who can provide the names of the parties and the
address of the subject premises;
(4) Records also can be disclosed to any nonparty on a showing of
"good cause," which would attach presumptively to journalists and
others doing bona fide research in the public interest;
(5) Records remain sealed after a settlement that ends in the tenant's
voluntary departure or that allows the tenant to remain on the
premises;
(6) Records become public in any of the following circumstances: the
tenant loses the case on the merits (whether or not the tenant
wishes to appeal), the court issues an unstayed execution (eviction)
order or the stay on an execution order expires, or the tenant loses
the case for failure to appear or failure to plead;
(7) Judicial opinions are open to the public immediately, regardless of
whether judgment has entered or the court simply has ruled on a
pretrial question.
The most significant difference between my proposal and California's existing
law involves point (2), under which records of undisposed cases may remain
sealed indefinitely. Under California's current law, records of undisposed cases
become public sixty days after filing.2 '
Another important caveat is that both journalists and parties seeking access
to eviction records after a showing of "good cause" would have to aver that
they would use the information contained therein only for research, and that
they would not sell or allow the records to be sold for compensation or profit.
This would be one step beyond the limitations already in place in California.
The selection of which persons would be entitled to journalistic access to sealed
records, however, would be left to judges to determine on a case-by-case
basis. '26 If a nonprofit "newspaper" subsidized by landlords and called the
124. If the tenant prevails, opinions should be released in a redacted form, using only the
defendant's initials.
125. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
126. Interestingly, California's access-restricting law was applied unevenly by judges. Some
courts granted the state's most notorious tenant-screening agency, U.D. Registry, a blanket
exemption from the law's provisions. See Pallack, supra note 31, at 344 n.16. However, these
judges' willingness to grant that exemption may have been related to the law's originally
stated purpose, which was to thwart unscrupulous eviction defense lawyers and not tenant-
screening agencies. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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Landlord Times began "reporting" on every eviction, presumably most judges
would look to the statute's purpose and deny access to those records.
Recall that we have identified three problems with tenant-screening
reports: error, abuse, and frustration of public policy. Unlike regulation
focusing on accuracy, this proposal does little to fix reporting errors.' Instead,
this proposal reduces abuse because the mere filing of an eviction no longer
necessarily cuts against a tenant's reputation, and it furthers public policy
because tenants will be less afraid to avail themselves of their legal rights.
Outcome-based record disclosure therefore complements approaches such as
the FCRA's.
Although legal scholars have considered the possibility of limiting access to
eviction records before, they have not proposed the conditional, justice-driven
disclosure endorsed here.128 This Part turns to further possible arguments
about the legislative scheme I have put forward. Sections A and B focus on
theoretical concerns, including jurisprudential or doctrinal arguments for and
against keeping eviction records sealed. Section C develops a practical example
by drawing on a parallel to criminal law, a context in which many states
condition the availability of court records on case outcomes.
A. Reasons To Keep Eviction Records Private by Default
Outcome-based record disclosure can prevent landlords from using tenant-
screening reports to abuse tenants or to vitiate their statutory rights. However,
several other arguments support the principle that it is both proper and entirely
within the ambit of state legislatures to pass such a law. First, economic
efficiency supports limiting disclosure to cases in which the tenant loses or
abandons her defense. Although screening reports might lubricate the gears of
127. I still would endorse independent adoption of approaches, such as Minnesota's, that require
filing parties to include (or add later) as much identifying information as possible, such as
date of birth, Social Security number, or driver's license number. See supra note 107 and
accompanying text. My proposed statute might, however, provide a marginal reduction in
the number of "false positive" (mismatch) errors simply because more lawsuits filed against
the wrong address or wrong name would have time to be corrected before the record
became public.
128. Robert Stauffer considered, in passing, the solution of "making court records of landlord-
tenant suits unavailable to the public," but he promptly abandoned it because "[s]uch a
measure might itself, however, violate the First Amendment." Stauffer, supra note 2, at 279
(emphasis added). Cheryl Sheinkopf briefly criticized the idea of banning access to public
record information but ultimately concluded that enacting an outright ban would violate
principles of open government, endorse paternalism, and decrease efficiency. See Sheinkopf,
supra note 2, at 1602-07; see also supra note 36. Neither author, however, considered the less
restrictive, conditional "ban" endorsed here.
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commerce by providing more information to landlords, there is a limit to
which information about tenants can be used to deny them housing; in any
case, it appears that current reports provide "dirty" information, contaminated
by data points that do not in fact indicate whether a tenant is likely to pay or to
create problems. Second, common law principles of privacy support sealing
certain landlord-tenant cases. Third, the democratically chosen public policies
of state legislatures may justify sealing court records in various contexts, even if
those policies-such as improving the market for rental housing-do not
directly interact with the court system. Fourth, basic ideas of fairness and due
process suggest that tenants should have an opportunity to prove their
innocence before having their names added to blacklists.
i. Efficiency
One of the first objections raised by advocates of transparency and
openness in court records is that "efficiency" demands that markets have access
to information whenever possible. Economic theory usually encourages society
to eliminate informational asymmetries, increasing efficiency for all sides.
Richard Posner has provided a classic application of information asymmetry
theory, stating that individuals' interests in keeping past litigation secret is
"akin to the concealment by sellers of defects in their products."' 29 He has even
criticized an information-withholding strategy similar to that endorsed by this
Note in his analysis of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 3' in which the Supreme
Court suggested that states, rather than journalists, should bear the burden of
having to decide how to balance privacy and the public interest."' Posner
argued that punishing the publication of sensitive material was a more efficient
mechanism to protect victims than the Court's ostensibly preferred strategy of
withholding information by "conducting rape trials in camera."3 ' But secret
trials are not the only way to keep sensitive information out of the public eye;
this Note suggests the possibility of a middle path.
The classic response to the efficiency objection is simply to attack its
premise and argue that efficiency is not the only value that courts or
government should pursue. In the context of tenant-screening reports, values
of efficiency are clearly in tension with access to affordable housing and the
129. Posner, supra note 9, at 174; see also Sheinkopf, supra note 2, at 16o6; Stauffer, supra note 2,
at 270.
130. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
131. See infra notes 169-17o and accompanying text.
132. Posner, supra note 9, at 2o8.
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right to be rejected only based on proper motives: "By dealing with privacy in
economic terms, Posner overvalues interests that are easily quantifiable and
undervalues interests that are more intangible.' 3  Indeed, just as we already
forbid landlords from denying housing because of membership in a protected
class -even if membership were correlated with a decreased ability to pay
rent-we similarly should prevent landlords from denying applications on the
grounds that the tenant appears willing to demand repairs and respect.
T3
But the analysis need not stop there. Another response to the efficiency
argument is that current landlord behavior actually may be inefficient from an
economic standpoint. 13s Whether or not landlords behave as news reports
suggest they do-treating tenant-screening reports like blacklists-is an
empirical question that has not yet been answered. But, if true, that behavior
might be inefficient because landlords are overreacting to an eviction action on
a tenant's record. Excess demand in the rental housing market, or strong risk
aversion on the part of landlords, or an incomplete understanding of how
evictions work (e.g., conflating a "filed" action with one in which the tenant
was actually evicted) might all lead to the same problem: landlords might
avoid tenants unnecessarily or demand unnecessarily high rents or deposits
simply because they incorrectly evaluate the risk of nonpayment or future
eviction that a particular tenant presents.
When they must evict tenants, landlords face a potentially huge cost. They
must often absorb filing and sheriff's service fees, as well the back rent itself if
their tenants are judgment-proof. A 1973 study found that unpaid back rent,
along with filing and service fees, cost landlords in New Haven anywhere from
$389 to $749 per eviction, 136 or, adjusting for inflation, between $1778 and
$3423 in 2006.37 According to a 1993 empirical study, New Haven landlords
usually lost around two-thirds of the total arrears owed by tenants after an
eviction action (about $15oo in 1993 dollars for unrepresented tenants, or
133. Stauffer, supra note 2, at 270.
134. I fully concede that another way to "prevent" landlords from relying on such grounds would
be simply to prohibit such reliance directly, as we do with suspect class discrimination. Yet it
is obvious that once landlords are presented with such information they have a powerful
economic incentive to deny housing to the tenant who is a possible "pain," see supra note 8
and accompanying text, and to justify that decision on other grounds.
135. I am grateful to Fadi Hanna for bringing this point to my attention.
136. See Note, supra note 42, at 15oo n.22. The amount was slightly higher when tenants had
legal representation.
137. The 20o6 value of 1973 dollars was calculated using the CPI Inflation Calculator. See Bureau
of Labor Statistics, supra note 113.
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$2092 in 2006 dollars). '38 Today, a typical landlord might spend more than
$500 out of pocket just on the removal itself: the landlord must pay for
movers, a sheriff or marshal to observe the process, and the cost of changing
the locks once the tenant's belongings have been removed.139 In an attempt to
avoid these costs, landlords thus turn to tenant-screening reports as a plausible
proxy for the eviction risk that a particular tenant presents.
Two problems arise from this approach, however. First, empirically
speaking, past evictions may be poorly correlated with whether a particular
tenant will require eviction in the future.1 40 But more importantly, even if a
correlation exists in theory, it might be overshadowed by other case-by-case
considerations- such as whether the tenant has had recent financial
difficulty -to the point at which, on a practical level, past evictions become
virtually useless as a proxy for potential evictions. Without transparent
empirical studies to measure the accuracy of tenant-screening reports, it is
impossible to know. Second, even if the landlord is right about the risk that a
"bad apple" tenant presents, the tenant may be unable to afford the appropriate
risk premium to compensate the landlord for that risk. As a result, risky
tenants will be priced out of the market and put into situations in which they
are more likely to fall behind on rent. Additionally, many states cap the
maximum security deposit at one or two months' rent.1 41 In other words, even
if a landlord could be convinced to accept a risky tenant as long as she put
forward a larger security deposit, state law might prohibit the landlord from
charging an appropriately high deposit amount. Taken together, these
constraints make it more difficult for the landlord to use the information in the
tenant-screening report in any effective way other than to simply reject the
tenant.
Efficiency therefore is better served by "purifying" the data in tenant-
screening reports. Filtering out cases in which tenants were not found guilty by
the courts (and thereby strengthening the stigma associated with an eviction)
also would help landlords reject some tenants and accept others along lines that
match society's normative commitments.
138. Gunn, supra note 15, at 417 & tbl.21; see Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 113.
139. See Gottesman, supra note 42, at 30-31 fig.6.
140. See Gunn, supra note 15, at 389 (summarizing a conclusion by Robert Danes that many
tenants in the housing courts are "repeat players," but finding no empirical evidence
demonstrating a causal link between prior and future evictions).
141. About half of the states have some sort of statutory maximum deposit amount. See STEWART
ET AL., supra note 41, at 427-32. I am certainly not arguing that these laws are out of place;
without them, excessively large deposits could be used to abuse tenants with the threat of
forfeiture.
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2. Privacy
Scholars have applied privacy theories to tenant-screening reports in useful
ways. In particular, Robert Stauffer's 1987 note extensively discussed both the
philosophical evaluations of the privacy interests at stake' 42 (such as the
dignitary harm that derives from the need to adjust one's behavior to
accommodate computer records) and the ways in which constitutional,
statutory, and common law privacy protections might limit the information
available in screening reports. 43 Stauffer did not apply privacy theory to court
records, mostly because he argued that the fact of the eviction itself should
remain private and individuals thus should be prohibited from mentioning
it.144
Privacy interests, however, have been emphasized in the context of court
records by legal scholars 4 and by organs of various state judicial branches
concerned about problems such as identity theft. 46 The balance of privacy
rights and openness in public records has commanded attention in state courts
for several years now, and states have varied significantly in the solutions they
have adopted. 147 But even those who reject the notion of privacy in open
court - arguing that "the law simply does not recognize any 'right of privacy,'
constitutional or otherwise, with respect to a public trial, either in the trial itself
or in the record of the trial" -should recognize the legitimacy of sealing court
142. The privacy right that attaches to reputation is clearly the "informational" kind articulated
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (189o). The right is not the decisional kind that
protects the right to an abortion or to use contraceptives, or the exclusional kind that
prevents government from compelling self-incriminating testimony or conducting
unreasonable searches and seizures. See Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or
Suspect: In Search of a Right, in Need of a Rule, 64 MD. L. REV. 755, 758-61 (2005).
143. See Stauffer, supra note 2, at 250-53, 259, 282-303.
144. My proposal does not justify sealing court records pertaining to eviction on the ground that
the fact of an eviction is inherently "private."
145. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 1O5
HARv. L. REV. 427, 464-67 (1991) (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized privacy
interests both in the information produced during discovery and in other "intensely
personal information" disclosed in the course of litigation).
146. For example, various states either have adopted or are in the process of considering new
rules to limit access to court records-particularly electronic access. See, e.g., Comments
Invited on New Rules for Electronic Access to Court Records, MONT. LAw., June-July 2006, at 31.
147. For a seminal report on this topic, see SUSAN M. JENNEN, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC COURT INFORMATION: A GUIDE TO POLICY
DECISIONS FOR STATE COURTS (1995), available at http://ctl.ncsc.dni.us/publicaccess/
legawritings/ncscl99Spub/papa.htm.
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records, because "when the government cumulates and indexes information,
... the Supreme Court has recognized that a person has a privacy interest to




Records also may be kept secret at the discretion of the state legislature. In
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Supreme Court stated that
[b]y placing the [court's private] information in the public domain on
official court records, the State must be presumed to have concluded that the
public interest was thereby being served. Public records by their very nature
are of interest to those concerned with the administration of
government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting of the
true contents of the records by the media.'49
By inverse reasoning, if a state legislature were to decide not to make court
records public, it must have concluded that keeping court eviction records open
was not required by the public interest.5 Critics would be hard-pressed to
present a jurisprudential reason why that information must remain in the
public domain. For example, state legislatures may determine that privacy
values take priority over public access to court records. 5' Or they may decide
that an unrelated interest-such as combating the social problems of addiction
to drugs or alcohol-justifies sealing court records in certain cases. 52
148. John P. Sellers, III, Sealed with an Acquittal: When Not Guilty Means Never Having To Say
You Were Tried, 32 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 18 (2003).
149. 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (emphasis added). For a more robust discussion of the First
Amendment values implicated in the disclosure of information in court records, and
specifically those implicated by the truthful reporting of tenant-screening agencies, see
Williams, supra note 2, at 1091-95. See generally Sheinkopf, supra note 2.
15o. And legislatures indeed have come to this conclusion in many cases. Examples are cited in
the Connecticut rules of courtroom procedure that are devoted to sealing court records or
documents. See CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RuLES § 11-2oA, cmt. 2005, in OFFICIAL 2007
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK 70, 178 (2007) [hereinafter CONN. PRACTICE BOOK], available
at http://www.jud.state.ct.us/Publications/PracticeBook/PBi.pdf.
151. For example, in Connecticut, the kinds of records that qualify for automatic nondisclosure
reveal the legislature's interest in privacy: taxpayer records, medical records, and psychiatric
records. See id. S 11-20, cmt. 2005, in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 15o, at 176; id. § 11-
2oA, cmt. 2005, in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 150, at 178.
152. Again, to take the example of Connecticut, court records related to pretrial alcohol education
also may be sealed. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-56g(a) (2007).
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Furthermore, legislatures can and have carved out exceptions for
"blameworthy" individuals not entitled to the same protections as those who
approach the court with clean hands. For example, under a Connecticut statute
creating a "pretrial alcohol education system," the court will not seal the record
of a defendant charged with driving under the influence who has already
participated in the program once in the last ten years, who has been convicted
of vehicular manslaughter or assault while under the influence, or whose
alcohol use caused "serious physical injury" to another person. s3 This approach
signals the legislature's intent to protect citizens from unnecessary reputational
harm unless other values (of fairness or retribution, for example) overcome
those independent normative commitments. 4
Sometimes legislatures delegate the final balancing to courts, while making
it clear that records can be protected when appropriate. The standard for
sealing records or documents in Connecticut, for example, is that records can
be sealed when an interest (such as privacy) outweighs the public's interest in
knowing. The standard for sealing records is essentially a balancing test, with
certain blanket exemptions. Records may be sealed "only if the judicial
authority concludes that such an order is necessary to preserve an interest
which is determined to override the public's interest in viewing such
materials."' Courts have discretion to determine what qualifies as an
overriding interest, weighing, for example, individual justice concerns against
economic ones, but this discretion is again limited by legislative priorities,
given that the rule on sealing court records begins with the statement that
documents filed in court will be made public "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by law.' ',1 6 Note also that this standard resembles the one employed when
considering a motion to close the courtroom to the public in civil cases' s7 and in
criminal cases8
153. Id.
154. Similarly, my proposal seeks to protect only those tenants who are not evicted and not those
tenants who lose in a trial on the merits or by default.
155. CONN. SUPERIOR COURT RuLEs § 11-2oA(c), in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 15o, at
176.
156. Id. § 11-2oA(a), in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 150, at 176.
157. See id. § 11-20, in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 150, at 174.
158. See id. § 42-49, in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, supra note 15o, at 341, available at
http://www.jud.state.ct.us/Publications/PracticeBook/PB2.pdf.
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4. Fairness and Due Process
Finally, it is a hallmark of blacklists that basic fairness and due process are
not afforded to those whose names appear therein.'59 Tenant blacklists are no
different because without mechanisms such as the one proposed here,
landlords can decide unilaterally to blacklist tenants. Landlords can do so by
voluntarily reporting negative information about their tenants or, worse yet, by
"creating" negative information that has the veneer of objectivity by filing
eviction actions. Although the FCRA entitles a tenant to a process to delete
erroneous items from credit reports, it does not protect tenants from the
arbitrary creation of such entries in the first place. Conditioning record
disclosure on a finding of the tenant's blameworthiness thus exports the due
process values protected by the courts into the nonjudicial realm of tenant-
screening reports.
B. Reasons To Keep Eviction Records Public by Default
Clearly, openness and transparency in the justice system advance many
traditional values of democracy and free society. The benefits of conflict
resolution "out in the open" have been called a "public good, ' ,, 6 ' and numerous
scholars have questioned the appropriateness of private settlements that are
adopted, at least in part, to shield one or both sides of the litigation from public
scrutiny. 6 While these arguments are germane to any discussion that involves
closing some aspect of the judicial system from public scrutiny, two aspects of
my proposal should neutralize these concerns: first, I propose that only court
159. See, e.g., Justin Florence, Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist
Watchlists, 115 YALE L.J. 2148, 2158-59 (2006) ("Once informed of their status, watchlisted
[i.e., blacklisted] travelers have no opportunity for a hearing.... The [Transportation
Security] Agency's procedures specifically provide that the process 'will not remove a name'
from the watchlist .... ").
160. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622 (1995).
The Supreme Court has articulated this view as well. See Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 374
(1947) ("What transpires in the court room is public property."); see also David A. Schulz,
Rethinking Confidentiality and Access in Civil Litigation, CoMM. LAw., Fall 2005, at 24, 24,
available at http://www.abanet.org/forums/communication/comlawyer/2ooS/Fallos.pdf
("[The Sedona Guidelines] seek to ... give fresh meaning to the notion that a 'trial is a
public event' and '[w]hat transpires in the court room is public property."' (second
alteration in original) (quoting Craig, 331 U.S. at 374)).
16l. See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dor6, The Confidentiality Debate and the Push To Regulate Secrecy in
Civil Litigation, in ROSCOE POUND INST., OPEN COURTS WITH SEALED FILES: SECRECY'S
IMPACT ON AMERICAN JUSTICE 9, 11 (2004); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073 (1984).
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records, and not the courtroom proceedings themselves, be closed to the public;
second, I provide an exception for journalists and others with a legitimate
purpose to review those records.
In this Section, I address specific concerns with the implications of my
proposal for openness and transparency.
1. First Amendment Doctrine and the Common Law
I begin with the simple observation that court proceedings should have a
fundamentally different standard of openness and transparency applied to
them than court records, which are significantly more administrative in nature.
The public and press have long held a First Amendment right to attend court
proceedings, but the Supreme Court has never held that the public has a
constitutional right of access to a court's records in civil cases. ' 62 The Court
held in a series of cases during the late 1970s and early 1980s that the First
Amendment clearly protects the public's ight of access to criminal
proceedings. 63 As it recognized in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, "the
right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment.",164 The Court declined to address whether civil cases also must
be open to the public, 6' but several circuits have extended the right of access to
civil court proceedings. 66
While the public's right of access to civil court proceedings is not clearly
specified in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the right of access to civil court
162. See United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 8o6, 812 (loth Cir. 1997) ("There is not yet any
definitive Supreme Court ruling on whether there is a constitutional right of access to court
documents and, if so, the scope of such a right."); see also Lynn E. Sudbeck, Placing Court
Records Online: Balancing Judicial Accountability with Public Trust and Confidence: An Analysis
of State Court Electronic Access Policies and a Proposal for South Dakota Court Records, 51 S.D. L.
REV. 81, 87 & n.14 (2006) (quoting McVeigh, and mentioning two cases in the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits that discuss a right of access to judicial records or court documents).
163. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) ("Underlying
the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that 'a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs."' (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))); see also John Gerhart, Access
to Court Proceedings and Records, COMM. LAw., Summer 2000, at 11, 12, available at
http://www.abanet.org/ forums/communication/comlawyer/summeroo/gerhart.html.
164. 448 U.S. 555, 580 (198o) (plurality opinion).
165. The Court nonetheless observed that "historically both civil and criminal trials have been
presumptively open." Id. at 580 n.17.
166. By the year 2000, at least the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits had suggested or endorsed a First Amendment right of public access to civil court
proceedings. See Gerhart, supra note 163, at 16 nn.35, 67, 69.
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records is even murkier. The few circuits finding that the presumption of a
public right of access to court records in civil cases is of "constitutional
magnitude" have also nevertheless recognized that compelling government
interests might still overcome that presumption.67
As mentioned earlier, 6 ' the Court suggested in Cox Broadcasting that the
onus for keeping certain information private should rest on the government,
not on journalists:
If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the
States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or
other exposure of private information. Their political institutions must
weigh the interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know
and of the press to publish. 
69
The Court also anticipated that constitutional issues might arise from a
decision to keep court records private: "We mean to imply nothing about any
constitutional questions which might arise from a state policy not allowing
access by the public and press to various kinds of official records, such as
records of juvenile-court proceedings.
1 ' 7 °
Subsequently, in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 71 the Court did
not explicitly answer the question of whether the First Amendment provides a
right of access to judicial records. Instead, it acknowledged that the public
conventionally had such a right, although it located the right of access in
common law principles: "[T] he right to inspect and copy judicial records is not
absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, and
access has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for
improper purposes. ' 172 The circuits have varied in their determinations of the
167. See, e.g., Ronald D. May, Public Access to Civil Court Records: A Common Law Approach, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1487 (1986) (describing how, after "avoid[ing] the constitutional
question and focus [ing] on the common law right of access," the Eleventh Circuit adopted a
compelling interest test with a narrow tailoring requirement).
168. See supra note 13o and accompanying text.
169. 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
170. Id. at 496 n.26. The Supreme Court has recognized in another context that not all kinds of
access to court records are the same. In a 1989 case decided under the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), the Court acknowledged "a vast difference between
the public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files ... and a
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of information," U.S. Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989).
171. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
172. Id. at 598; see also Sudbeck, supra note 162, at 85-86.
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strength of the common law right of access to court records and whether a First
Amendment right of access to civil court records does indeed exist. 
73
This question of whether First Amendment or common law rights to
attend criminal trials can be applied to the inspection of civil records remains
unanswered. 74 I simply observe that either the First Amendment or common
law traditions provide us with some access to court records, but that the
particular structure of the statutory proposal here weakens the claimed public
interest in the contents of those records. Specifically, disclosing records in an
outcome-dependent way means that the evictions with real interest to the public -
good-faith, meritorious actions-are ultimately unsealed.' Furthermore,
because the proposal gives journalists unfettered access to court records, the
initial nondisclosure thwarts only the commercial interests of landlords and
tenant-screening agencies. Finally, releasing memoranda of judicial decisions
to the public and keeping the courtrooms and proceedings open will preserve
the values of transparency and popular supervision potentially located in the
First Amendment.
2. Other Values
In Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court articulated some of the values
inherent in the openness of criminal procedures, citing to Hale and Blackstone:
openness "gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all
concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and
decisions based on secret bias or partiality. '',76 Those benefits probably do not
redound to the judiciary simply because its records are open to public
inspection. Put simply, open proceedings keep proceedings fair, honest, and
impartial because citizens are present inside the courtroom, physically
173. Compare Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 71o F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983)
("Simply showing that the information would harm the company's reputation is not
sufficient to overcome the strong common law presumption in favor of public access to
court proceedings and records."), with In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773
F.2d 1325, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) ("To the extent a First Amendment right to post-
judgment civil records exists, it does not exceed, for the reasons discussed earlier, the
traditional common law right.").
174. On circuit splits concerning rights of access to civil cases and judicial records, see Raleigh
Hannah Levine, Toward a New PublicAccess Doctrine, 27 CARDozo L. REV. 1739, 1758 (2006);
and Melissa B. Coffey, Note, Administrative Inconvenience and the Media's Right To Copy
Judicial Records, 44B.C.L. REV. 1263, 1272-84 (2003).
175. As a reminder, this presumes the normative commitments that I articulated supra note 12
and accompanying text.
176. 448 U.S. 555, 569 (198o) (plurality opinion).
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watching how their fellow citizens are behaving. Participants in the justice
system would not feel the same watchful presence of those who simply read the
transcript or examine court records after the fact.
All of the benefits mentioned by Blackstone -ensuring fairness,
discouraging perjury and misconduct, and dispelling impressions of bias -are
desirable in eviction cases. Landlords and tenants also need to know what the
law actually requires; they need to trust the courts to be fair; and at least some
eviction cases can expose abusive landlords or tenants to public scrutiny.
Similarly, the public's presence in the courtroom might make tenants and
landlords better-behaved and perhaps more amenable to settlement. However,
none of these values would be affected by sealing the court's records on
evictions - at least not when sealing is limited to cases in which the tenant
prevailed or the parties settled.
Indeed, other states have begun to rethink the level of openness in their
court records more generally. While these states are often concerned with the
availability of other personally identifying information, such as Social Security
numbers, their arguments for the permissibility of sealing records are
substantially the same as my own: it is acceptable to limit the disclosure of
court records when the information contained therein "does nothing to shed
light on the workings of the judiciary. ''177 One objection to this argument is
that while Social Security numbers, birthdates, and other sensitive information
may be incidental to the workings of the justice system, information such as
the disposition of the case is essential if students of the judiciary are ever to
"shed light" on its workings. That is why I would allow journalists and any
other person on a showing of good cause to examine the court's summary
process records.
A final value asserted in favor of protecting open records is antipaternalism:
"[Restricting] access to public records for fear that disclosure will have adverse
effects on those mentioned in the records is engaging in the sort of paternalism
deplored by the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.''17' There
are two responses to this argument. First, literally speaking, it is not in fact
"paternalistic" to level the informational playing field between landlords and
tenants by making it harder for landlords to harm a tenant's reputation
without justification or process. Paternalism involves diluting or removing a
person's autonomy "for her own good," while allowing a tenant to decide when
court records concerning her are released to the public enhances tenant
autonomy. Second, even if this protection is indeed paternalistic, there is
177. Sudbeck, supra note 162, at 82.
178. Sheinkopf, supra note 2, at 1607 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
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nothing wrong with paternalistic measures undertaken on behalf of
populations that lack the skills and resources to defend themselves effectively-
and those most affected by erroneous, misleading, or abusive eviction items
almost certainly lack the resources to combat this problem on a wide scale.
C. Examples and Parallels
Finally, the legality and feasibility of conditional disclosure of court records
has already been demonstrated: consider not only the examples of legislative
priority-making discussed in Subsection III.A.3 but also, in another context,
the expunction of criminal records. Many states permit criminal defendants to
"expunge" their criminal records if the crime was not too serious and the
accused appears either innocent or rehabilitated. In criminal cases, the public's
interest in sunshine and transparency is heightened, but so too may be an
innocent defendant's interest in privacy and a rehabilitated convict's interest in
privacy or forgiveness. While the precise meaning of expunction varies by
state, a generally consistent trend is that an expunged record erases all traces of
the arrest, trial, and conviction (if applicable) from police and court records.
1 79
A person may even lie about whether she has ever been arrested or convicted of
the crime in question. 8,
Two kinds of expunction are relevant here. The first is when criminal
defendants acquitted of their charges are entitled to have their police and
criminal records expunged and the court's records of the case sealed -a form of
outcome-dependent record closure. For example, an Ohio statute 8' turned
what used to be an extraordinary case of expunction into an action "demanded
as a matter of right.", 8 2 According to one summary:
Should the trial court determine that the applicant's interests are
paramount to those of the state to maintain its record, the court is to
place all "official records" of the case under seal. "Official records"
refers not only to the trial record, but also to all records and
investigative reports possessed by law enforcement, as well as other
governmental agencies . .. In fact, law enforcement officials are
179. For an elaboration on expunction, see Michael D. Mayfield, Revisiting Expungement:
Concealing Information in the Information Age, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 1057.
18o. See id. at 1o59 ("[M]ost states authorize offenders whose records have been expunged to
respond negatively when questioned whether they have been convicted of a crime.").
181. See OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 2953.51-.61 (West 2006).
182. Sellers, supra note 148, at 3.
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effectively "gagged" from further discussing the matter with any
interested member of the public or the press ...."'
Yet this particular approach to outcome-based record management is notable
in part for its extreme cost. As critics of expunction have pointed out, the ex
post purging of the court's institutional memory is costly and often
incomplete.184 Instead of trying to put the cat back into the bag when the
defendant is proven innocent, I propose releasing the information only when
the tenant is found blameworthy.s The fact that some states are willing to
pass expunction laws, however, only points more strongly to the conclusion
that an individual's interest in a clean record can justify the related
administrative costs.
In the second kind of expunction, criminals can be convicted but allowed to
expunge their records at some later date, usually based on a theory of
forgiveness and rehabilitation. For example, in Oregon, "any defendant who
has fully complied with and performed the sentence of the court" and whose
crime fits certain criteria may apply for an order setting aside the conviction
after three years have elapsed from the date of judgment. 86 Furthermore, if
that motion is granted, "the court shall issue an order sealing the record of
conviction and other official records in the case, including the records of arrest
whether or not the arrest resulted in a further criminal proceeding.' ' 187 In other
words, convicted criminals are granted a clean slate for relatively recent
transgressions, yet in almost every state, an innocent tenant who prevails on
the merits against her landlord is not entitled to a similarly clean slate.
Of course, it is important not to overstate the extent to which expunction
allows a person to have a "clean slate" either before or after a conviction.
Because records are only sealed ex post facto, the information may already be
available from other sources. Expunction alone is insufficient to achieve
183. Id. at 7 (footnotes omitted).
184. See Mayfield, supra note 179, at 1066-72.
185. For a discussion of the futility of efforts to restore both animals and genies to their
respective enclosures, see Eric B. Easton, Closing the Barn Door After the Genie Is out of the
Bag: Recognizing a "Futility Principle" in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 1
(1995). See also Daniel Lombard, Note, Top Secret: A Constitutional Look at the Procedural
Problems Inherent in Sealing Civil Court Documents, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. lO67 (2006).
186. OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225(1)(a) (2005).
187. Id. 3 137.225(3).
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forgiveness and rehabilitation, because while court records may be expunged,
private copies of court records remain unaffected. 88
CONCLUSION
Easier and more open access to public records is a trend that will and
should continue as society and government grow more complex. Such
disclosure is necessary not only to avoid corruption and provide the "sunshine"
sought by freedom of information laws but also to increase reporting accuracy
and economic efficiency. However, knowing too much also cuts against the
values of individualism and justice that have kept our country's economic
engines strong. Pure economic interest cannot justify all information
disclosures.
This Note's proposal, therefore, walks this tightrope between public and
private interests in the particularly important context of landlord-tenant
disputes. Evictions are necessary, and their swift and fair adjudication should
not be impeded by a fear that those who come before the court face undeserved
harm to their reputation. Large, anonymous databases of eviction litigants need
not be opened to public scrutiny until those litigants have received the due
process to which they are entitled. In the end, outcome-dependent disclosure
makes government look better as well. By keeping courtrooms open but some
records closed, states can be sure that the individual reputations and privacy
rights of their citizens are protected while the machinery of justice remains
subject to public examination and supervision.
188. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1725-26 (2003) ("Moreover, far
from being literally obliterated, 'expunged' records almost always remain available for use
by law enforcement agencies and the courts, and in some states they may be accessible to
other public agencies and even to private investigative services hired to perform criminal
background checks for employers."); Liptak, supra note 86.
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